sensations engendered by thoughts with emotions (cf. Damasio). And unless one distinguishes between the causes and the objects of emotions, and between feeling an emotion and realizing what emotion one feels, one may think that identifying the cause of an emotion plays a role in emotionperception (cf. Phillips 7 ), whereas in fact there is no such thing as perception of one's own emotion, and the ability to say what emotion one is feeling need not depend on identifying its causes but does depend on identifying its object.
Feelings
The word 'feeling' is multivalent. It is important not to confuse its different meanings (Fig. 1 ).
Fig. 1 -Types of Feelings Distinguished
We must distinguish the feelings that are perceptions from the feelings that are sensations. To feel the heat, solidity, elasticity or dampness of an object with one's hand, elbow or cheek are forms of tactile perception. To do so is to exercise a cognitive faculty. To feel a pain, tingle or tickle, however, is not a form of perception. To feel a pain is no different from having a pain. Such sensations are localized in the body (it always makes sense to ask where one feels them), but are not felt with any part of the body. Sensations, unlike perceptions, are not correct or incorrect, and the liability to have sensations is not a cognitive faculty. Localized bodily sensations must be distinguished from sensations of overall bodily condition, such as feelings of weariness or lassitude.
Appetites are distinct from affections. Natural appetites are feelings of hunger, thirst or blind animal lust. Non-natural (acquired) appetites are addictions. Natural appetites are blends of sensation and desire characteristic of animals (see Fig. 2 ). The sensations characteristic of appetites are localized -the sensation of hunger is located in the midriff, of thirst in the parched throat. The sensations associated with appetites are forms of unease that dispose one to action to satisfy the appetite. The desire blended with sensation is characterized by its formal object (e.g. hunger is a desire for food, thirst for drink, lust for sexual intercourse). Distinctive of desires constitutive of appetites is their lack of a specific object (one cannot be hungry for dessert but not for the main course). The intensity of the desire constitutive of appetite is typically proportional to the intensity of the sensation. Fulfilling an appetite leads to its temporary satiation and so to the disappearance of the sensation. Appetites are not constant, but recurrent, typically caused by bodily needs (or hormonally determined drives) consequent upon deprivation of food, drink or sexual intercourse.
Fig. 2 -Conceptual Links of Appetite
Affections, like appetites and sensations, are felt. The feelings that are affections can be divided into emotions, agitations and moods (see Fig. 3 ). One feels love or hate (emotions), excited or astonished (agitations), cheerful or depressed (moods). Unlike sensations, affections do not have a bodily location and do not inform one about the state of one's body, even though they are sometimes linked with sensations. One does not feel pride in one's chest, even though one's chest may swell with pride, or fear in one's mouth, even though one's mouth may feel dry with fear. One's blush of shame does not inform one of the state of one's facial arteries, although it may inform one that one is more ashamed than one thought, and one's tears of grief do not inform one of the state of one's lachrymal glands, although they may inform one that one loved Daisy more than one thought. Unlike 5 feelings that are perceptions, the affections do not inform one about the world.
Paradigmatic emotions are such things as love, hate, hope, fear, anger, gratitude, resentment, indignation, envy, jealousy, pity, compassion, grief, as well as emotions of self-assessment such as pride, shame, humiliation, regret, remorse and guilt. The conceptual structure of the emotions will be described below.
Agitations are short term affective disturbances, typically caused by something unexpected. Agitations are modes of reaction: one cries out in horror or amazement, recoils with revulsion or disgust, is convulsed with laughter or paralysed with shock. Occurrently felt emotions, by contrast with longer standing emotional attitudes, often bear a kinship to agitations in the perturbations of, for example, the throbbing temples of rage, the trembling, sweating and shallow breathing of fear, the tears and cries of grief.
Moods are such things as feeling cheerful, euphoric, contented, irritable, melancholic or depressed; they are states or frames of mind, as when one is in a state of melancholia, or in a jovial or relaxed frame of mind. They may be occurrent or longer term dispositional states. One may feel depressed for an afternoon, or one may be suffering from a depression that lasts for months. As disposition, a mood is a proneness to feel, during one's waking hours, joyful, depressed, cheerful, etc.
Moods are less closely tied to objects than emotions, for one may feel cheerful or depressed without one's mood being directed at any specific object, whereas one cannot feel love without feeling love for someone or something or feel angry without feeling angry with anyone or about anything.
Equally, moods are linked not to specific patterns of intentional action, but to manners of behaviour.
Cheerfulness, melancholia and depression, unlike love, envy or compassion, do not provide motives for action, but they are exhibited in the manner in which one does whatever one does, in one's demeanour and tone of voice. This is a corollary of the fact that moods colour one's thoughts and 6 pervade one's reflections.
Fig. 3 -Types of Affection
It is, therefore, unwarranted to characterize moods, as Damasio does, as emotional states that are frequent or continuous over long periods of time. 8 One may fear war for a long period, but that does not imply that one is in any particular mood, although, to be sure, one's fear may contribute to one's melancholic mood. Othello's jealousy was persistent and continuous, but unlike his consequent depression, it was not a mood. And frequently to fear things may be to be timorous by nature, but it is not to be in any mood.
The difference between affections in general and emotions in particular, on the one hand, and appetites, on the other, should be evident. Recent work on appetites has been mischaracterized as a result of failure to note it. E.T. Roles (2000) anxiety may crystallize into a specific fear. The psychological category of the affections displays both conceptual complexity and diversity, the conceptual patterns to be discerned are irregular, and the variations from type to type are considerable. Consequently most generalizations concerning the concepts within the three sub-categories need to be qualified with a 'for the most part' or a 'typically'. §3. Emotions
Emotion words function as names of character traits (loving, affectionate, proud), of motives (acting out of or from hatred, envy, jealousy) and of felt emotions. The notion of felt emotion does not discriminate between episodic emotional perturbations and longer-standing emotional attitudes.
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Emotional perturbations (see Fig. 4 ) resemble agitations in certain respects. Some, e.g. fear or anger, have characteristic somatic accompaniments, both sensations that are felt and physiological reactions that are measurable. Others do not, e.g. feelings of pride, humility, compassion, gratitude and respect.
They are manifested in expressive behaviour which may take various forms. It may be behaviour that
is not action at all, as in the case of blushes of embarrassment or love, and perspiration and pallor of fear. It may be voluntary (the utterances of love and affection, of hope or pride), partly voluntary (raised voice of anger, that can be inhibited) or involuntary action (cry of terror). And it may be exhibited merely in the manner of acting (e.g. tone of voice, impatient actions of anger). Some emotional perturbations are closely associated with relatively specific forms of intentional and instrumental action or inclinations to act, as in the case of fear of imminent danger (inclination to avoid or flee) or pity (inclination to help). Others, such as regret or hope, are not. Some, in the case of human beings, are directly linked to reasons for acting and to motivated action, e.g. fear of a dangerous object is linked to acting out of fear for the reason that the object is dangerous, and pity is linked to acting to ameliorate the condition of another for the reason that they are suffering. Others have no such direct (but only indirect) links to motivated action. In characterizing someone as 'being emotional', we typically mean that he is prone to emotional perturbations, given to outbursts of feeling, which he expresses freely, perhaps to excess, and tends to allow his emotions to cloud his judgement.
Fig. 4 -Conceptual Links of Emotional Perturbations
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Emotional perturbations have further attributes which they share with emotional attitudes, e.g. causes, objects, agential reasons for the feelings and for their constitutive beliefs, reasons for acting, appraisal and evaluation. These will be examined below.
It is important not to allow the perturbational aspect of the emotions to occlude their attitudinal aspect, or to think that research on the perturbations characteristic of an emotion can provide an adequate account of that emotion. Neuroscientific work, influenced by the misconceived Jamesian theory of the emotions, has screened out the attitudinal, as well as the motivational, cogitative and fantasy aspects of the emotions. One may love or hate a person, an activity, a cause, or a place for the whole of one's life. One may be proud of the achievements of one's youth for the rest of one's days, and one may respect or detest, be envious or jealous of a person for years. One may be ashamed or guilty of one's misconduct for decades, and one's regret for one's follies may never cease.
One's judgement may be clouded not only by emotional agitation and distress (perturbation), but also by one's long-standing resentments, envies or jealousies (emotional attitudes). Love may be felt as a perturbation to which those who are falling in love are susceptible, or as a standing attitude of conjugal, parental, filial or fraternal feeling. The emotional attitude of love is not a disposition to corresponding episodes of loving perturbation, but a lasting concern for the object of love, a standing motive for action beneficial to the beloved, a desire for shared experience, and a persistent colouring of thought, imagination and fantasy. The standing emotion of anger with a person is not a proneness to episodic outbursts of anger, but persistent ill-will and absence of amiability resting on the agent's reasons for his anger. The emotions of love, hate or envy, for example, consist above all in the manner in which the object of the emotion matters to one and the reasons for which it is important (one cannot feel indifferent about the object of one's feelings); hence also in the motives that move one to action -for one will act out of love, hate or envy. One's emotions are then evident in the reasons that weigh with one in one's deliberations, in the desires one harbours and in the thoughts that cross one's mind in connection with the objects of one's feelings. One's emotions are inseparable from one's fantasy life and imagination, one's wishes and longings (see Fig. 5 ).
Fig. 5 -Conceptual Links of Emotion
It should be obvious that one cannot measure a person's emotion simply by the frequency or intensity of the emotional perturbations he feels. Fear may be manifest in the lengths one goes to avoid the situations that terrify one. Its motivating force cannot be quantified as rises in pulse-, breathing-or perspiration-rates can be. Rather, its strength is evaluated by the extent to which the emotion determines behaviour over time and the kind of behaviour it determines. The depth of a person's remorse is exhibited less in episodic outbursts of remorse, more in the endeavours to make amends and in the obsessive thoughts about his wrongdoing. The strength of a person's love is manifest not just in felt perturbations, but also in his concern for the welfare of the object of his love and in the sacrifices he is willing to make for the sake of what or whom he loves. One may concede that a long-standing emotional attitude may, given appropriate circumstances, imply a lower threshold for the onset of corresponding emotional perturbation (e.g. in the case of anger or hatred). But that is, at best, only part of the story, since appropriate circumstances may not obtain (given assiduous avoidance behaviour, as in the case of fear of heights), the agent may exercise self-control, and the relevant perturbational behaviour may not be that of the emotion in question (as in the case of love, which is exhibited in the wide variety of forms of care and concern). Any experimental investigation of the emotions must take into account the complexity of the concept of an emotion, the conceptual diversity of the emotions, and cultural variability of the reasons for and the motivating character of the emotions to which human beings are susceptible. There is no single paradigm of an emotion that can serve as a conceptual prototype from which to generalize.
Equally, one must beware of experiments on non-human animals as a basis for generalizations concerning human emotion. For the horizon of actual emotions as well as the horizon of possible emotions in animals is far narrower than with human beings. It is determined by the fact that animals are not language-using, concept-exercising creatures. They can fear something here and now, but they cannot now fear something elsewhere tomorrow, as we can. And they cannot feel such emotions as remorse, which requires a knowledge of good and evil, an awareness of having done wrong, and a determination to make amends. Animal emotion is neither reasonable nor unreasonable, whereas human emotion may be, since human beings may have reasons and justifications for feeling as they do, and the feelings they have may afford them reasons for acting. The study of human emotions is a study of human emotions. And the study of human emotions presupposes the background of specific cultural forms of human life. warranted, either at all or to the degree to which he feels it, we criticize him for the unreasonableness of his emotional response. It is unreasonable, we may say, to be jealous about something as trivial as that; or, while conceding that A's spouse's behaviour is an intelligible ground for jealousy, we may criticize A for the intensity of his jealousy, i.e. for his excessive reaction. A person may feel an emotion as a result of a false belief. Normally discovery of the falsity of the belief eliminates the emotion. If the grounds for one's fear evaporate, the fear will normally evaporate with it.
Conversely, things being thus-and-so may be a reason for feeling a given emotion -and those who come to know or to believe that things are so, and who care, will normally feel that emotion. They have a reason for so feeling. The reasonableness of emotions lies in such forms of sensitivity to reasons in a given social and cultural context, and it is here that the responsibility a person has for his emotions resides. The emotions we feel are reasonable (within the framework of the culture and times to which we belong) to the extent that they are directed towards an object that warrants the feeling, and to the extent that the intensity of the emotion felt is proportional to its object. Of course, the knowledge of the facts that constitute a reason for feeling such-and-such an emotion do not necessitate any such feeling. But if one does not respond appropriately to the tragic or joyful circumstance, one is deficient in sensibility, and lacks the feeling proper to the circumstance -which is a mark of not caring about things which, in general, we think we should care about. §4.
Misconceptions: Damasio
Damasio's work on emotionally incapacitating brain damage is renowned, and his insistence on a link between the capacity for rational decision-making and consequent rational action in pursuit of goals, on the one hand, and the capacity for feeling emotions, on the other, is thought-provoking.
Damasio's conception of the emotions is influenced by James, who held that emotions are the feelings of somatic disturbances consequent on the perception of an 'exciting fact'. An emotion, according to James, is not the somatic change, but the agent's perception of it. Every one of these bodily changes is allegedly perceived as soon as it occurs. One cannot abstract from an emotion 'all the feelings of its bodily symptoms' and find anything left behind other than a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception. 9 Damasio himself sees 'the essence of emotion as the collection of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event. ' (Damasio 1994, p. 139 Accordingly, Damasio proposes the somatic marker hypothesis. The hypothesis is that somatic responses to 'images' (i.e. perceptions and thoughts) serve to increase the accuracy and efficiency of decision processes, screening out a range of alternatives and allowing the agent to choose from among fewer (ibid., p. 173). 'When a negative somatic marker is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive' (ibid., p. 174). So somatic markers, constituted by the somatic response to situations confronting us, assist deliberation by highlighting some options and eliminating them. These somatic responses which we allegedly use for decisionmaking 'probably were created in our brains during the process of education and socialization, by connecting specific classes of stimuli with specific classes of somatic state' (ibid., p. 177). Culturally inculcated 'gut reactions' provide the basis for rational decision making. This leads Damasio to conjecture that the decision-making and executive deficiencies in patients suffering from lesions in the prefrontal cortices is explained by lack of somatic markers to guide them.
This idea is conceptually questionable. and learning how to use these terms ('afraid', 'angry', etc.) in the expression of one's feelings towards the appropriate objects, in the description of the feelings (but not the sensations) of others, and in the giving of explanatory and justifying reasons for one's reactions and actions.
Thirdly, if emotions were ensembles of somatic changes caused by mental images, then one could not have good reasons for feeling a certain emotion, and would not be answerable for one's emotions in the manner in which we are. For although there may be a reason (i.e. an explanation) why one has a headache, or why one's breathing-rate or heart-beat rises, one cannot have a reason (i.e. a ground or warrant) for such things. Given appropriate circumstances, we can say that someone ought to, and has good reason to, feel proud or ashamed, but we cannot say that he ought to raise his pulse-rate or increase his psychogalvanic reflex reactions.
Fourthly, one can feel an emotion E without any E-type perturbation. One can love a person, object (a piece of music, a book or painting, a landscape) or a value (justice, honour) without undergoing any somatic changes distinctive of love when one thinks about them. There need be no somatic changes accompanying the thought that the rate of inflation is likely to rise -but one may well fear that it will. If A did one an important favour in one's youth, one may remain forever grateful -but one need not break out in a sweat whenever one thinks of it. There are no distinctive somatic changes characteristic of pride in something -or of many other types of emotion and many other emotions with certain kinds of object. One might argue that by definition to feel an intense occurrent emotion does require some somatic changes. But even in such cases, the somatic changes do not identify the emotion.
To insist on these points is not to deny that there is a link between certain emotions and emotions directed to specific objects, on the one hand, and types of emotional agitation involving inter alia somatic changes, on the other. The emotional agitation may be characteristic of that emotion or of that emotion with that type of object, given appropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, the emotion is not the somatic changes that might be caused by the thought (or mental image) of the object of such an emotion. Moreover, it would be misguided to suppose that by studying the neural concomitants of artificially induced emotional perturbations (e.g. by pictures or music) and the effects on cognitive performance, one is actually studying the emotion in all its complexity (the kinds of reasons for the emotion (both perturbation and attitude), the kinds of motivation it affords (and why), the kinds of behaviour it motivates, its dependency upon social and cultural norms, the kinds of unreasonableness or irrationality that may be manifest and the reasons and causes of them).
(ii) Perceiving an object or perceiving that things are thus-and-so does not involve having object of one's indignation is an evil is not that one feels flushed in association with the thought of the act in question. On the contrary, one is indignant at A's action because it is unjust, not because one flushes in anger when one hears of it. One knows it to be unjust because it rides roughshod over someone's rights, not because one flushes in anger. Indeed, the flush is only a flush of anger in so far as one is thus indignant. And one will feel indignant only to the extent that one cares about the protection of the rights of human beings (or of this human being).
One might conjecture that although Damasio may be perfectly correct in associating the capacity for rationality in practical reasoning and in pursuit of goals with the ability to feel emotions, the linkage lies in a common feature underlying both. Since the emotions do not let us 'mind the body', and since feeling the somatic reactions to circumstances is not a litmus-paper test for good and Contrary to what Damasio claims, there need be nothing 'hidden' about the emotions of others. It is mistaken to say that 'you cannot observe a feeling in someone else ' (Damasio, 1999, p. 42) . It is equally mistaken to think that 'you can observe a feeling in yourself'. We are prone to confuse the fact that we often do not show our feelings and sometimes indeed make an effort to conceal them, with the misguided idea that the emotions are in some deep sense 'private' and 'hidden'. But this is confused. We can often see delight and rage in a person's face, joy, anguish or horror in his eyes, contempt or amusement in his smile. We can hear the love and tenderness, the grief and sorrow, the anger and contempt in a person's voice. We can observe their tears of joy or grief, cries of terror, joy or amazement, and blushes of embarrassment or shame. On the other hand, to feel an emotion oneself, for example, to feel proud or ashamed, is not to observe anything. This has multiple ramifying consequences for psychiatric theories that seek to explain such phenomena as autism in terms of children's deficiencies in formulating theories about the psychology of others. But that is a tale for another occasion.
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